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NOTES
CALLER INTELLIDATA: PRIVACY IN TILE
DEVELOPING TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
George Orwell's 1984 discusses the implications that technology and
information gathering can have on privacy.' It describes a world where Big
Brother monitors the everyday conduct of its citizens through technologically
advanced equipment 2 In 1984, Big Brother is the government. In 1997, Big
Brother is business. Modem businesses want information about consumers to
improve the production, quality, marketing, and distribution of their goods
and services. This Note examines how businesses use a new technology,
known as Caller Intellidata ("Intellidata"), in computers and
telecommunications to gather consumer information. Further, this Note
analyzes the legal implications that Intellidata's information gathering has on
privacy.
On September 6, 1995, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
("SWB") 3 filed an application with the Missouri Public Service Commission
("MPSC")4 to introduce Intellidata in Missouri.5 Intellidata, an information
1. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
2. See id.
3. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company ("SWB") is a subsidiary of SBC Communications
Inc. ("SBC"), one of the world's leading diversified telecommunications companies, and the second
largest wireless communications company based in the United States. SBC's businesses include
wireless services and equipment, business and consumer telecommunications equipment, messaging
services, cable television interests in both domestic and international markets, and directory
advertising and publishing. SWB operates in Texas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Kansas. See
Southwestern Bell Introduces Advanced Intelligent Network (AJN) in Kansas City: AIN Enables
Business to Cater Telecommunications To Their Customers (visited Sept. 23, 1997)
<http://www.swbell.com/News/Article.html?wquery-type=article&query--19960328-01>.
4. A public service commission in each state governs the regulation of utilities such as phone,
electricity, and gas within that state. Missouri Revised Statute § 386.040 established the MPSC in
Missouri. The jurisdiction, supervision, powers, and duties of the this commission extend to all
telecommunications facilities, services, and companies within Missouri. See MO. REV. STAT.
§ 386.250(2) (1996).
"Telecommunications service" is the transmission of information by wire, radio, optical cable,
electronic impulses, or other similar means. "Information" means knowledge or intelligence
represented by any form or writing, signs, signal, pictures, sound, or any other symbols. See id
§ 386.020(53) (1996).
5. Part III of this Note describes Caller Intellidata in greater detail.
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gathering service, provides businesses with monthly reports related to their
incoming telephone calls. 6 Shortly after SWB filed the application, the
Missouri Office of Public Counsel stated that the service "smacks of Big
Brother by big business.",7 SWB withdrew its application for Intellidata from
the MPSC on Thursday, October 5, 1995, one day after critics announced
that the service constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy.8 Thereafter,
SWB announced that it would consider refiling a scaled-back version
sometime in 1996. 9
SWB has not yet refiled a scaled-back version of Intellidata;
consequently, Intellidata currently has an uncertain status in Missouri. The
primary purpose of this Note is to analyze the legal implications of Intellidata
before the service is reintroduced in Missouri. Specifically, this Note
addresses the actual and potential privacy issues with respect to
constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law. The secondary
purpose of this Note is to provide a legal framework that addresses privacy
issues of future information gathering technologies in computers and
telecommunications.
Part II of this Note outlines the history and development of information
gathering telecommunications services. Part III describes Intellidata. Part IV
analyzes Intellidata's implications on privacy. Part V concludes that the
personal information provided by Intellidata threatens privacy more than the
demographic information, and applies different areas of the law to those
privacy issues. Finally, Part VI proposes two regulatory solutions to the legal
6. See generally Before the Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company's Tariff Revision to Introduce a New Service Called Caller Intellidata (No.
TT-96-68, Tariff No. 9600133) (Mo.P.S.C. 1995). The Missouri Office of Public Counsel filed a
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Suspend SWB's Tariff with the MPSC on
September 6, 1995, the same day SWB filed its proposal to introduce Caller Intellidata in Missouri.
See id. SWB filed a response to the Office of Public Counsel's motion on September 11, 1995. See id.
The Office of Public Counsel filed a Reply to Southwestern Bell Telephone Company's Response on
September 13, 1995. See id. On September 19, 1995, SWB filed a Response to the Office of Public
Counsel's Reply to Southwestern Bell Telephone Company's Response. See id.
On September 29, 1995, the MPSC suspended (as opposed to cancelled or rejected) SWB's tariff
to offer Intellidata. See id. The MPSC's Suspension set hearings on the matter for November 16th
through 17th, 1995. SWB's deadline to submit written testimony was October 27, 1995. See id. The
Office of Public Counsel's deadline to submit written rebuttal testimony was November 7, 1995. See
id. SWB withdrew its proposal on October 5, 1995 before the scheduled deadlines. See id. The MPSC
filed a final order dismissing the case on October 12, 1995. See id.
7. Steve Everly, New Phone Service Revives Privacy Issue, From Customer's Call To A
Business, Bell Can Glean Marketing Data, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al.
8. See Steve Everly, Caller Intellidata Is On Hold, Southwestern Bell Plan To Offer Detailed
Information About Callers To Missouri Businesses Is Withdrawn, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 6, 1995, at
B 1. See also supra note 6.
9. See Jerri Stroud, Bell Backs Off Caller-ID Request Firms Would Get Caller's Profile, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 1995, at 10C.
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issues arising from the use of Intellidata.
II. THE HISTORY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
On August 27, 1992, SWB submitted a tariff to the MPSC designed to
implement Caller Identification ("Caller ID") as a new telecommunications
service in Missouri. 1 Caller ID provides its subscribers with the calling
party's telephone number, first and last name, and the date and time of the
call." Subscribers pay a monthly fee and purchase a display device on which
the information about the calling party is transmitted.'2 On March 18, 1993,
the MPSC authorized SWB to provide Caller ID in Missouri.
13
Caller ID originally offered only the calling party's phone number and the
date and time of the call. 14 Soon after its introduction, Caller ID expanded to
include the local calling party's first and last name.' 5 Caller ID expanded
again to include this information for incoming long distance calls.16 The
historical progression of Caller ID creates a paradigm: as
telecommunications technology advances, the amount of information
10. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., No. TR-93-123, 144 P.U.RI4th 528 (Mo.P.S.C. 1993)
(MPSC order authorizing Caller ID in Missouri).
11. See id. For more information about Caller ID and its privacy implications, see infra note 24.
12. See State ex rel. Office of Pub. Counsel v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 311,
313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (OPC appeal of MPSC's order authorizing Caller ID in Missouri).
Subscribers to Caller ID must pay a monthly fee and purchase a device that displays the identification
information. See id. The information of the calling party is not displayed if the call originates from
outside of the area where Caller ID is available, is made from a cellular phone, is operator assisted, is
made using a credit card, is made from a party line, or is the second call received using Call Waiting.
See id Caller ID also does not display the party's information if that calling party applies a blocking
option. See id. For information discussing blocking options, see infra note 13.
13. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 144 P.U.R.4th at 528. This order authorizing Caller ID
in Missouri requires that Caller ID implement those service conditions designed to protect the public
interest, including free per-call blocking for everyone and free per-line blocking for law enforcement
and domestic violence intervention agencies. See id. Per-call blocking allows a user to block the
transmission of her name and number by dialing a code, *67 in Missouri, before dialing the phone
number. See State ex rel. Office of Pub. Counsel, 884 S.W.2d at 314. When this code is used, the
transmission on Caller ID equipment indicates that the souce of the call is "anonymous" or "private."
In addition, per-line blocking dials anonymously automatically without entering a code before dialing.
See id.
The Office of Public Counsel appealed the MPSC's order authorizing Caller ID, but the Missouri
Court of Appeals affirmed the order. See id. at 313-17.
14. See id. at 313. See also Filing by N.J. Bell Telephone Co. of a Revision of Tariff B.P.U.-N.J.
No. 2, Providing for the Introduction of CLASS Calling Service on a Limited Basis, Docket No.
TT87070560 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utilities July 16, 1987) (first time Caller ID service introduced in United
States).
15. See infra note 16.
16. See Southwestern Bell's Caller ID to Display More Long-Distance Phone Numbers and
Names (visited Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.swbell.com/News/Article.htl?query-type-article&query-
19960515-01>.
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disseminated increases. Intellidata, described in Part III, supports this
paradigm.
Caller ID's popularity is growing.' 7 Yet, critics argue that Caller ID is an
invasion of privacy.' 8 Specifically, they argue that Caller ID uses technology
surreptitiously to gain personal information about people without their
consent.'9
In Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,20 a Pennsylvania
trial court held that Caller ID violated the Pennsylvania wiretap statute and
the caller's privacy rights under both the Pennsylvania and U.S.
Constitutions.21 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial
court's holding with respect to the wiretape violation.22 However, the court
declined to review the trial court's holding that Caller ID violated the state
and federal constitutions. 23
Legal scholars began discussing the issues raised by Caller ID only after
its introduction.24 Yet, the debate over Caller ID laid a foundation to address
17. Nearly one Southwestern Bell customer out of three in Texas, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, and Kansas subscribes to Caller ID. Today 32.25% of all residential customers of SWB
subscribe to Caller ID. See Consumer Demand For 'Caller ID' Continues To Soar: Southwestern Bell
Announces Its Three Millionth Subscriber (visited Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.swbell.com/
News/Article.html?query-type=article&query=19960822-02>. Proponents of Caller ID argue that
callers implicitly consent to the information transferred when they make a call. They also argue that
Caller ID is helpful in reducing prank phone calls and increasing privacy in the home by allowing
subscribers to screen phone calls. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., No. TR-93-123, 144 P.U.R.4th
528 (Mo. P.S.C. 1993).
18. See State ex rel. Office of Pub. Counsel v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 311,
313, 315 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (OPC appeal of MPSC's order authorizing Caller ID). See also infra
note 22, at 1199 n.2. Some critics argue that Caller ID is unnecessary to reduce prank phone calls and
provide screening privacy because other services such as Call Blocking and Call Trace meet these
goals without revealing the caller's personal information.
19. See supra note 18.
20. 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding that Caller ID is illegal).
21. Seeid. at90-91.
22. See Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 605 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Pa. 1992). In
affiming the trial court's holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said, "[W]e agree with the
Commonwealth Court that the service still violates the wiretap law, because it is being used for
unlimited purposes without the 'consent' of each of the users of the telephone service." Id. The court
further stated, "It is the caller whose number is being trapped and traced and whose privacy is being
jeopardized, and whose 'consent' would therefore be particularly relevant." Id. at 1203.
23. See id. at 1203. The court stated, "We need not reach the constitutional issues decided by the
Commonwealth Court majority in this case because we have long held that our courts should not
decide constitutional issues in cases which can properly be decided on non-constitutional grounds." Id.
24. See Susan M. Felkowski, Note, Caller Identification Technology And The Challenges In
Adapting To Telecommunications Innovations, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 415 (1991); Laurie Thomas Lee,
U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Policy And Caller ID, 30 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1993); Steven P.
Oates, Note, Caller 1D: Privacy Protector Or Privacy Invader?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 219 (1992);
Glenn Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional To Give It Out?): Caller
Identification Technology And The Right To Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REV. 145 (1989).
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the legal implications of new technologies such as Intellidata. As Professor
Glenn Smith predicted over seven years ago,
[C]aller Identification is the opening chapter of a larger story of
rapidly changing telecommunications technology which brings with it
unique privacy dilemmas. As the telephone becomes even more of an
"intelligent network" at the center of the "information age," new
challenges for privacy and the law are certain to arise.25
Professor Smith's prediction proved correct a few years later when SWB
introduced the "Advanced Intelligent Network" and one of its services,
Intellidata.
III. INTELLIDATA
Intellidata is part of SWB's Advanced Intelligent Network ("AIN").26
AIN combines a central computer database with new telecommunications
technology to provide an array of call-management services for business
27
customers. Intellidata provides businesses with monthly reports containing
25. Smith, supra note 24, at 223. Intellidata and Caller ID are just two examples of how
telephone technology can affect privacy. For a broader discussion of telecommunications privacy, see
Robert Asa Crook, Sony, Wrong Number: The Effect Of Telephone Technology On Privacy Rights, 26
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 669 (1991).
26. See Advanced Intelligent Network (visited Dec. 28, 1996) <http://www.sbc.comf
swbell/wct/ain.html>; AIN Business Solutions (visited Dec. 31, 1996) <http://www.sbc.com/
swbell/shortsublain.html>; Southwestern Bell Introduces Advanced Intelligent Network (AIM) in
Kansas City: AIN Enables Businesses to Cater Telecommunications To Their Customers (visited Sept.
27, 1997) <http://www.swbell.com/NewsArticle.htl?query-ype=article&query= 19960328-01>;
Southwestern Bell Telephone Introduces Advanced Intelligent Network (A IN) in Dallas-Fort Worth:
AIN Enables Businesses to Cater Telecommunications to their Clients (visited Dec. 28, 1996)
<http://www.sbc.com/swbelllnow/newslarchives/960214-Ol.html>; Mediafile: First Market for Three
Advanced Telephone Services (visited Oct. 9, 1996) <http://www.sbc.comlcgi-bin/
cgiwais?getdes .... comlcgi-bin/cgiwais&keywords-intellidata>; Mediafile: Southwestern Bell
Telephone Announces Advent of Advanced Network Technology in Austin (visited Dec. 28, 1996)
<http://www.sbc.com/swbell/now/news/archives/nr950424-Ol.html>; see also infra notes 27 and 29.
27. In addition to Intellidata, AIN offers businesses other advanced telecommunications services.
IntelliNumber enables a business to advertise a single metro phone number for all locations that
automatically directs calls to the location specified by the business. See Southwestern Bell Introduces
Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) in Kansas City: AIN Enables Businesses to Cater
Telecommunications To Their Customers (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.swbell.com/News/
Article.html?query-type=artile&query=19960328-01>. Disaster Routing Service ("DRS") avoids
dead phone lines and customer confusion by redirecting calls to alternate locations during natural
disasters or other emergencies. See id. Intelligent Redirect offers call routing options that enable
businesses to provide important customers with priority treatment that route calls to alternate locations
based on customer-specific criteria such as time-of-day and day-of-week. Such treatment also balances
loads among multiple locations through percentage routing. AreaWide Networking allows businesses
with multiple locations to merge into a single communications network through inter-office dialing,
centralized routing, and remote access to the private network via a public network. See id. Ironically,
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information about incoming telephone calls.28
Intellidata's monthly reports are both "specific" and "general." 29 The Call
Detail Report provides specific information about the caller, such as the
caller's name, address, area code, phone number, and origin (business or
residence).3  Conversely, the Summary Report provides general information.
For instance, it contains computer generated statistical summaries on
incoming calls such as the hourly distribution of calls by day of the week.3'
Businesses use this general information to predict the busiest times of the
day. This type of information allows businesses to serve customers more
efficiently by adjusting their workforce during certain hours of the day or on
certain days of the week.
The Summary Report also provides businesses with demographic
information, displaying demographic codes with information about the
Positive ID, an AIN service, helps businesses secure their computer and voice networks from
"hackers." See Southwestern Bell Introduces "Padlock" for PCs: Positive ID Responds To Growing
Need To Safeguard Computer And Voice Networks Of Medium, Large Businesses (visited Sept. 27,
1997) <http://wwvv.swbell.com/News/Article.html?query-type=article&query=19960405-0 1>.
28. The information comes in tabular and graphical formats on paper or computer diskette.
Graphical reports are available on paper, while tabular report formats are available on paper or
computer diskette. See infra note 29.
29. Before The Public Service Commission Of The State Of Missouri, Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company's TariffRevision To Introduce A New Service Called Caller Intellidata, Case No.
TT-96-68, Tariff No. 9600133 (Mo.P.S.C. 1995) (this case is on file with the office of the MPSC).
SWB proposes to revise the General Exchange Tariff, P.S.C. Mo.-No. 35 by adding a new Section 50,
known as Advanced Intelligent Network Services. This new section would introduce Caller Intellidata.
See id More useful and detailed information about Intellidata is found in unpublished brochures and
advertising pamphlets produced by SWB. In addition, the Southwestern Bell website also provides
general information about Intellidata and its numerous features. See How Does It Work? Caller
Intellidata (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.swbell.com/cgi-bin/page.exe?file=Prod\Vork.html&
PRODUCTCODE=CIN&BACKURL=&BACKTEXT=>.
30. See How Does It Work?, supra note 29. The Call Detail Report also provides the date, day,
and time of the call. See id.
31. See id. The Summary Report-Individual also provides: the total number of calls, number of
calls by day and date, number of calls by day of the week, hourly distribution of calls by day of the
week, hourly distribution of calls per month, number of calls by telephone exchange (area code and the
first three digits of the calller's telephone number), number of calls by zip code + 4, number of calls by
demographic code (i.e., consumers' lifestyles, purchasing behavior, income levels, and education), and
a graphical distribution of zip codes and telephone exchanges on geographic maps. Individually these
services range from $7.50 per month to $20 per month, but the Summary Reports Package includes all
six summary reports for $39 per month.
The Graphical Report is only available with the purchase of the summary tabular All Reports
Elements package or the Deluxe Report Package. The Deluxe Package includes Call Detail, all
Summary Reports, and Graphical Reports. The Graphical Report format provides the following data:
number of calls by day the of month, number of calls by day of the week, hourly distribution of calls
during the month, hourly distribution of calls on a specific day of the weeks, number of calls by
telephone exchange (provided by graphical map), number of calls by Zip code + 4 (provided by
graphical map), and distribution of calls by demographic code. The Deluxe Package costs $120.00 per
month. See id.
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caller's purchasing behavior, lifestyle, marital status, income, education, and
household size.32 These reports utilize fifty different demographic codes to
categorize callers.3 One such code, called "Young and Carefree," provides
detailed information on people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine,
while another code, "Secure Adults," provides breakdowns on adults fifty-
five years and older. Intellidata uses the U.S. Census, consumer surveys, and
other data that profile a zip code + 4 to develop the caller's demographic
profile. A caller's demographic information is therefore generalized and
based on statistics from households within that area.
34
Callers can reduce Intellidata's information gathering abilities by utilizing
a blocking option, having a non-published or unlisted telephone number, or
omitting their address from the directory.35 These options generate a report
that reflects the caller's five-digit zip code instead of the zip code + 4.36 A
blocking option also prevents the caller's phone number, name, and street
address from disclosure.37 An unlisted phone number likewise prevents
disclosure of the caller's street address and origin (business or residence).3S
Finally, an unlisted address prevents disclosure of the caller's street
address.39
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTELLIDATA
Opponents of Intellidata argue that the service constitutes an invasion of
privacy because it uses telecommunications technology surreptitiously to
gain personal information from people without their consent.4 0 The notion of
a "right to privacy" dates back to 1890 when Justices Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis urged broad legal recognition of a right to privacy in a now
32. See id. The demographic information is compiled by Equifax Corporation, an Atlanta-based
marketing and information company, by using the zip code + 4 of each caller. The data from Equifax
is based on a sophisticated, demographic tracking system known as Equifax MicroVision codes. For
additional information on Equifax, see Equifax: Managing A World Of Information (visited Dec. 31,
1996) <http://www.equifax.com>.
33. See How Does It Work?, supra note 29. Other demographic codes include Upper Class
Families, Upper Class Singles, Sunset Suburban Singles, Good Country Life, Average Suburban
Households, Young Families, Students and Starters, Hard to Reach, Blue Collar Blues, Poor Families,
Struggling Rural Families, Economic Lower Class, Struggling Urban Single Parents, and Businesses.
34. See Everly, supra note 7.
35. See How Does It Work?, supra note 29.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See supra note 6. See also State ex rel. Office of Pub. Counsel v. Missouri Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
1998]
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famous law review article entitled The Right To Privacy.41 The Justices
defined the right to privacy as "the right to be let alone."A2 The notion that
Intellidata invades a right to privacy or a "right to be let alone" implicates
many areas of the law.43
A. Constitutional Right to Privacy
1. Jumping the Procedural Hurdle: State Action
The protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution do not apply to actions
of private parties,44 but rather only apply to actions of government.45 Any
constitutional challenge to Intellidata must therefore satisfy this state action
requirement. Although SWB is a private corporation, its proposal to offer
Intellidata as a telecommunications service within Missouri must be
approved by the State of Missouri through the MPSC.4 6 Thus, the threshold
question is whether the MPSC's role in approving Intellidata as a
telecommunications service constitutes state action.47 The Supreme Court has
stated that, in determining whether there is state action, "[T]he inquiry must
be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."48 In conducting this inquiry, the
Supreme Court relies on several factors."9
41. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975), the Supreme Court refers to the Warren
and Brandeis article as the "root article" of the right to privacy. See also Richard C. Turkington,
Legacy Of The Warren And Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right To
Privacy, ION. ILL. U. L. REv. 479 (1990).
42. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 41, at 195.
43. Although most of this Note discusses the constitutional right to privacy, the final section of
Part IV elaborates on the other legal implications that Intellidata has on privacy. In addition, Part V
concludes that other areas of law, namely regulatory or administrative law, provide a more efficient
means of opposing Intellidata than constitutional law.
44. See. e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323,330 (1926); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); see also infra note 47.
45. See Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 330; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3.
46. SeeMO. REv. STAT. § 386.250(2) (1996).
47. The Supreme Court has stated, "While the principle that private action is immune from the
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the question whether
particular conduct is 'private,' on the one hand, or 'state action,' on the other hand, frequently admits
of no easy answer." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974) (citing Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972)).
48. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutionality of
telecommunications services like Intellidata, see Smith, supra note 24.
49. The Jackson Court stated: "As our subsequent discussion in Burton made clear, the
dispositive question in any state action case is not whether any single fact or relationship presents a
sufficient degree of state involvement, but rather whether the aggregate of all relevant factors compels
[VOL. 76:351
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First, the Court is more likely to treat private actions as those of the state
if they serve a public function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State."50 The Court has applied this public function doctrine to invoke
constitutional protections against privately owned towns, 1 privately owned
parks,52 private political associations,5  and privately owned shopping
centers. 4 Second, the Court is more apt to conclude that private conduct is
truly state action if the state is involved in the private conduct "to some
significant extent."5 Third, state authorization of private conduct may
a finding of state responsibility." 419 U.S. at 360. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961), the Supreme Court stated, "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can
the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at
722.
The state action factors described in this Note often overlap, and many constitutional
commentators use different names and categories. An in depth discussion of state action doctrine goes
beyond the scope of this Note. For a more detailed discussion of state action, see Daphne Barak-Erez,
A State Action Doctrine For An Age Of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1169 (1995); Dilan A.
Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 663 (1995); see also
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 920 (12th ed. 1991) (a discussion of recent state action
cases).
50. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. In Marsh v. Alabama, the Court subjected the actions of a privately
owned town to constitutional restraints because the town's function was so public in nature that its
actions may be treated as those of the State itself. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Jackson, the Court narrowed
the public function doctrine to private conduct "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." 419
U.S. at 352.
Recent cases have followed this narrow approach to the public function doctrine. See Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978) (discussing public function theory and cases). For a
further discussion of public function doctrine, see Esper, supra note 49, at 687-709.
51. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 501.
52. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), the Court focused on the nature of a park and
concluded that a park was traditionally public and thus was more similar to fire and police
departments, rather than golf clubs, social centers, luncheon clubs, and schools. The Court stated:
A park, on the other hand, is more like a fire department or police department that traditionally
serves the community. Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain
(citation omitted) and state courts that aid private parties to perform that public function on a
segregated basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment Like the
streets of the company town (citation omitted), the elective process (citation omitted), and the
transit system (citation omitted), the predominant character and purpose of this park are municipal.
Id. at 302.
53. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (where a state delegates an aspect of the elective
process to private groups, they become subject to the same restraints as the state).
54. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (holding that a trespass law could not be applied to stop First Amendment activity-union
picketing of a supermarket-in a privately owned shopping center). But see Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
55. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In Reitman, the Court determined "whether the
State has significantly involved itself' enough in private conduct for that conduct to be treated as that
of the State itself. Id. at 380. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961), the
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of an African-American patron from a privately operated
restaurant located in a building financed by public funds and owned by a state agency constituted
sufficient state involvement to invoke constitutional protection. See id. The Court determined that the
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convert the conduct into that of the state itself,56 authorization is similar to
encouragement because the result is to selectively approve certain conduct.
However, the Court distinguishes encouragement from mere authorization
and places greater weight on encouragement as a fourth factor in determining
the existence of state action. 7 Finally, if the private entity possesses a
monopoly conferred or protected by the state, the private conduct may be
treated as that of the state.58
The facts surrounding Intellidata at least partially satisfy each of the
factors described above.59 First, although the MPSC is not involved with
restaurant and the State were joint participants for its involvement because the state parking authority
owned the building and could have required the private restaurant owner to serve all persons. See Id. at
725. The Court stated, "[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the
[Constitution] unless to some significant extent the State... has been found to have become involved
in it." Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
But cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the operation of a State's
regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor board did not sufficiently involve the State of
Pennsylvania in the discriminatory policies of Moose Lodge to render those policies state action);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (state regulation of a private business is
insufficient involvement by itself). See also GUNTHER, supra note 49, at 909.
56. In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court indicated that private actions must be either "sanctioned
by the state" or "done under state authority" in order to be considered those of the State. See 109 U.S.
3, 17 (1883). Further, the Burton Court, found implicit authorization through the State's inaction
sufficient to treat the private action involved as that of the State itself, even though the State did not
encourage or order the private conduct. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725; see also supra note 55. In
addition, in Reitman, the Court found sufficient state action because a specific state constitutional
provision "was intended to authorize, and does authorize" the private discrimination. 387 U.S. at 381.
But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) ("This Court, however, has never held
that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State"). See
GUNTHER, supra note 49, at 912.
57. See supra note 56; see also infra notes 63, 83, 85, and accompanying text. Although the
authorization and encouragement standards are both used to determine whether the state is responsible
for private conduct, there is a fine, albeit important distinction between the two in state action cases.
The Supreme Court distinguishes between a public utility commission providing authorization through
a general tariff not specifically related to the private conduct, versus encouragement through a
commission's hearings and subsequent decision on the specific private conduct in question.
Therefore, courts are more likely to construe the MPSC's hearings on the approval of Intellidata
as encouragement rather than mere authorization. This encouragement categorization increases the
likelihood that the facts surrounding Intellidata will overcome the state action procedural hurdle. See
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 356-57 (distinguishing the public utility commission's hearings and involvement
in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952)); see also Moose Lodge No. 107,
407 U.S. at 176-77 (suggesting that if the State's regulation had in any way fostered or encouraged the
private conduct, a state action finding might have been justified); see GUNTHER, supra note 49, at 912.
58. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 366-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing cases that support
monopoly status as a factor in determining whether constitutional obligations can be imposed on
private entities); Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 177 (stating that the lack of monopoly status
conferred upon the private entity was a contributing factor in the no state action holding). For a further
discussion of the monopoly status factor, see Bruce NV. Blakely, Comment, Public Utility Bill Inserts,
Political Speech, And The First Amendment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right To Reply, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 1221, 1239-41 (1982).
59. Although the MPSC regulates SWB, the involvement factor is not applicable because the
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SWB in a joint venture, it does regulate many aspects of SWB's business.6 0
Second, SWB serves a public function by providing telephone services
throughout Missouri.61 However, it is unclear whether telephone services
were "traditionally exclusively reserved to [Missouri]. 62 Third, the MPSC's
investigation, hearing, and authorization of Intellidata are facts that indicate
encouragement, rather than mere authorization. 63 Finally, although SWB has
a monopoly on phone services, recent legislation prevents Missouri from
protecting SWB's monopoly.6
4
The following cases demonstrate the importance of the encouragement
factor in state action cases involving public utilities.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,65 Capital Transit Company was
a privately owned public utility corporation that owned and operated a street
railway and bus system.66 The Public Utilities Commission of the District of
Columbia regulated Capital Transit's public transportation service and
equipment.67 Capital Transit introduced "music as you ride" radio programs
MPSC is not involved in SWB's telecommunications business to "some significant extent" as a joint
venturer or participant. See supra note 55. The MPSC's regulatory role is more applicable to the
encouragement factor. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. The procedure of authorizing
Intellidata would include investigation and hearings conducted by the MPSC. See supra note 29.
Therefore, the facts surrounding Intellidata satisfy the authorization factor but are more similar to the
encouragement factor.
60. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.250 (1996); see also supra note 59.
61. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing the public function doctrine).
62. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. See also infra note 64. Examining the history of telephone service
in Missouri goes beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, this history is relevant in determining
the strength of the public function factor in state action cases.
63. See supra notes 56-57; see also infra note 85. The fact that the MPSC's role in authorizing
Intellidata is similar to the encouragement factor rather than the authorization factor increases the
likelihood that privacy concerns regarding Intellidata will overcome the state action procedural hurdle.
64. See Competitive Telecomms. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 886 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994) (describing SWB as a noncompetitive telecommunications service under Missouri law);
see supra note 62.
Missouri law states:
No certificate of service authority issued by the commission shall be construed as granting a
monopoly or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise. The issuance of a certificate of service
authority to any telecommunications company shall not preclude the commission from issuing
additional certificates of service authority to another telecommunications company providing the
same or equivalent service or serving the same geographical area or customers as any previously
certified company, except to the extent otherwise provided by section 392.450.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.410.3 (1996). A 1996 amendment to this section deleted "except a grant of
authority to provide basic local telecommunications service" following "issued by the commission" in
the first sentence. However, the MPSC retains the right to classify and regulate a telecommunications
service as "noncompetitive." MO. REv. STAT. §§ 392.370.3 and 392.480.1 (1996).
65. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
66. See id. at 454.
67. See id.
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on its streetcars and busses.68 After protest, the Public Utilities Commission
investigated "music as you ride" and concluded that it was not inconsistent
with public convenience, comfort, and safety.69 The issue in Pollak was
whether the action of Capital Transit in installing and operating the music
service, coupled with the action of the Public Utilities Commission in
dismissing its own investigation into the practice, constituted state action.70
The Pollak Court held that the relationship between the State and the
radio service was sufficiently close to invoke constitutional protection. 71 The
Court recognized but did not rely upon the fact that Capital Transit was a
private company operating a public utility and that the State granted Capital
Transit a substantial monopoly in public transportation.72 Instead, the Court
based its decision on the role of the Public Utilities Commission in regulating
and supervising Capital Transit's public transportation service. In particular,
the Court focused on the Commission's own investigation, hearings, and
decision to authorize the radio service.73
68. See id. at 455. The music was received and amplified through loudspeakers on the streetcars
and busses. See id.
69. See id. at 457. The Court dismissed the investigation after concluding "that the installation
and use of radios in streetcars and busses of the Capital Transit Company is not inconsistent with
public convenience, comfort, and safety." Id. at 457 (quoting the Public Utilities Commission
investigation at 81 P.U.R. (N.S.) 122, 126). After considering arguments from both sides concerning
"music as you ride," the Commission said,
"From the testimony of record, the conclusion is inescapable that radio reception in streetcars
and busses is not an obstacle to safety of operation.
Further, it is evident that public comfort and convenience is not impaired and that, in fact,
through the creation of better will among passengers, it tends to improve the conditions under
which the public ride."
Id. at 458-59 (quoting the Public Utilities Commission investigation at 81 P.U.R. at 126).
In addition, the Commission's investigation included hiring a private company to conduct a public
opinion survey to determine the attitude of Capital Transit customers toward transit radio. See id. at
459.
70. Seeid.at461.
71. See Pollak, 343 U.S. at 462. The Court said, "We find in the reasoning of the court below a
sufficiently close relation between the Federal Government and the radio service to make it necessary
for us to consider those Amendments." Id.
72. See id. The Court said:
In finding this relation we do not rely on the mere fact that Capital Transit operates a public utility
on the streets of the District of Columbia under authority of Congress. Nor do we rely upon the
fact that, by reason of such federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial
monopoly of street railway and bus transportation in the District of Columbia.
Id.
73. See id. The Court stated:
We do, however, recognize that Capital Transit operates its service under the regulatory
supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia which is an agency
authorized by Congress. We rely particularly upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests
against the radio program, ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered
its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not
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In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,74 a customer brought suit against
Metropolitan Edison Company, a privately owned and operated electric
utility corporation. The suit alleged that the company violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by terminating a customer's electric service before she had been
afforded notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts due. 5 In
order to deliver electricity in Pennsylvania, Metropolitan held a certificate of
public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.76
As a condition to granting the certificate, Metropolitan subjected itself to
extensive regulation by the Commission." The general tariff filed with the
Commission gave Metropolitan the right to discontinue service to any
customer upon reasonable notice.78 Jackson presented the question of
whether Metropolitan's termination of the customer's service for alleged
nonpayment, a permisible action under its general tariff, constituted state
79
action.
The Jackson Court held that the State of Pennsylvania was not
sufficiently connected with the act of terminating Jackson's electricity to
render Metropolitan a state actor.80 The Court said that even extensive state
regulation of public utilities and the existence of a state-granted monopoly
cannot by themselves convert the action of a private entity into that of the
State.8' The Court recognized but rejected the public function factor because
impaired thereby.
Id
74. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 346.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 346 n. 1.
79. See id. at 348.
80. See id. at 358-59. The Court stated, "We conclude that the State of Pennsylvania is not
sufficiently connected with respondent's action in terminating petitioner's service so as to make
respondent's conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. Further, the Court stated:
All of petitioner's arguments taken together show no more than that Metropolitan was a heavily
regulated, privately owned utility, enjoying at least a partial monopoly in the providing of
electrical service within its territory, and that it elected to terminate service to petitioner in a
manner which the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission found permissible under state law.
Under our decision this is not sufficient to connect the State of Pennsylvania with respondent's
action so as to make the latter's conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 358; see also infra note 81.
81. See id. at 350. The Jackson Court stated, "[tihe mere fact that a business is subject to state
regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nor does the fact that the regulation is extensive and detailed, as in the case of most
public utilities, do so." Id. (citations omitted). Regarding the monopoly status factor, the Court stated,
"[als a factual matter, it may well be doubted that the State ever granted or guaranteed Metropolitan a
monopoly. But assuming that it had, this fact is not determinative in considering whether
19981
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSUIY LAW QUARTERLY
Pennsylvania law did not consider the delivery of utility services
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."82 The Court also rejected the
notion that Metropolitan's termination was state action because the State
authorized and approved the termination practice in its general tariff.s3 The
Court's standard for holding the State responsible for private action was
higher than mere authorization.84 The Court required encouragement such as
ordering the proposed practice, similar to the action of the Public Utility
Commission in Pollak.85 Finally, the Court did not find any relationship
between the State and the private utility company to suggest that the State
was a joint participant in Metropolitan's business. 86
Metropolitan's termination of service to petitioner was 'state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 351-52; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 352-53. Jackson narrows the public function factor from actions of private entities that
substantially affect public interest to those traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; see also
supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
83. See id. at 354 ("We also reject the notion that Metropolitan's termination is state action
because the State 'has specifically authorized and approved' the termination practice.").
84. See infia note 85 and accompanying text.
85. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354-57. The Supreme Court distinguishes between actions by the
state or a public utility commission that specifically authorize or approve the private conduct, and
those that generally authorize or approve the private conduct. See id. The Court considers specific
authorization and approval closer to the higher standard of encouragement, while general authorization
and approval is an insufficient nexus between the state and the private entity to hold the state
responsible for the private action. For example, the Court distinguishes the Public Utility
Commission's general tariff provision authorizing the termination practice in Jackson, from the Public
Utility Commission's specific investigation and authorization of "music as you ride" in Pollak. See id.
The Court stated that, "[a]lthough the Commission did hold hearings on portions of Metropolitan's
general tariff relating to a general rate increase, it never even considered the reinsertion of this
provision in the newly filed general tariff." Id. at 354-55.
The Court further indicated that
In either event, the nature of the state involvement there [Pollak] was quite different than it is here,
The District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission, on its own motion, commenced an
investigation of the effects of the piped music, and after a full hearing concluded not only that
Capital Transit's practices were "not inconsistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety,"
(citation omitted) but also that the practice "in fact, through the creation of better will among
passengers ... tends to improve the conditions under which the public ride." Ibid. Here, on the
other hand, there was no such imprimatur placed on the practice of Metropolitan about which
petitioner omplains.... Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated
utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by
ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission
into "state action."
Id. at 356-57. The Court also suggests that the State is responsible for the private conduct where the
State initiates such conduct. See id. at 357.
Justice Marshall's dissent interprets the majority opinion as requiring the Public Utility
Commission to hold hearings before state action is found. See id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
He says that "The majority's test puts potential plaintiffs in a difficult position: if the Commission
approves the tariff without argument or a hearing, the State has not sufficiently demonstrated its
approval and support for the company's practices." Id. at 370.
86. Seeid.at357-58.
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The Pollak and Jackson decisions provide the framework for the
dinstinction between encouragement and authorization. 87 In Pollak, where
the Court did find state action, the public utility commission approved the
radio service after holding hearings specifically related to this service.88 In
Jackson, where the Court did not find state action, the utility commission
approved the termination of the customer's electrical service by a general
tariff provision rather than specific hearings. 89 The Court differentiates
Jackson from Pollak based on this encouragement/authorization distinction.
Jackson interprets Pollak as requiring a public utility commission to
investigate and conduct hearings on the specific private conduct in question
before deeming the conduct state action.
90
The encouragement/authorization distinction is of particular importance
in the context of Intellidata because the MPSC would hold specific hearings
on the privacy issues surrounding Intellidata before approving the service.
Therefore, it is possible that the MPSC's hearings on, and approval of,
Intellidata would constitute state action thereby invoking the constitutional
right to privacy.
2. The Substantive Right to Privacy: The "Penumbras"
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly confer a "right to privacy., 91
The Supreme Court did not recognize a constitutional right to privacy until
1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut.92 Griswold struck down a Connecticut
statute that forbade the use of contraceptives because it violated the right of
marital privacy.93 However, the Justices disagreed as to the origins of the
87. See supra notes 56-57, 63, 83-85, and accompanying text.
88. Seesupra note 73.
89. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354-55.
90. Seesupra note 85.
91. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating
that "as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this
one [privacy], which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.").
92. Id. at 479; see also infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; Turkington, supra note 41, at
496 (interpreting Griswod's holding as the first Supreme Court case to recognize a right to privacy
under the Constitution independent of the Fourth Amendment). As a prelude to Griswold and its
progeny, Justice Brandeis' now famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 ("The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
1998]
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constitutional right to privacy.94 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
derived the right to privacy from several amendments, which he referred to
as the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights.95
In 1977, the Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to
informational privacy in Whalen v. Roe.96 The Whalen Court upheld a New
York law under which the State recorded the names and addresses of all
patients obtaining prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs in a centralized
computer file.97 Whalen recognized two aspects of a right to privacy:98 the
right to avoid disclosure of personal matters;99 and the right to personal
privacy in decisiomaking. 100 While the Whalen Court did not find a
surrounding the marriage relationship.").
94. In Griswold, three Justices wrote separate opinions addressing the basis for so-called privacy
rights. Justice Douglas found the basis of the right to privacy in the "penumbras" of the Constitution.
See id. at 484; see also infra note 101 and accompanying text. Justice Goldberg found that the Ninth
Amendment did not expressly create the right to privacy, but that it authorized the Court to identify
and protect such a right. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487. Specifically, he stated, "I add these words to
emphasize the relevance of that [Ninth] Amendment to the Court's holding." Id. Justice Harlan
concluded that the right to privacy was found in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty. See id. at 500. Justice Harlan stated, "In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case
is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id. (citation
omitted); see also Oates, supra note 24, at 225 (citation omitted) (interpreting the various opinions in
Griswold).
95. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas stated: "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. (citation omitted). Justice Douglas'
opinion discusses a right to privacy as derived from the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. See id. at 481-85.
96. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). A complete discussion of the constitutional right to informational
privacy exceeds the scope of this Note. For more discussion on the issue, see David H. Flaherty,
Symposium, The Right To Privacy One Hundred Years Later: On The Utility Of Constitutional Rights
To Privacy And Data Protection, 41 CASE \V. RES. L. REV. 831 (1991); see also Turkington, supra
note 41.
97. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591. A lower court held the patient identification provisions of the
state law unconstitutional because they invaded constitutionally protected rights of privacy. See id. The
Supreme Court concluded that "the New York program does not, on its face, pose a sufficiently
grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation." Id. at 600; see also GUNTHER,
supra note 49, at 573-74.
98. The Court stated, "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600; see also Gary R. Clouse, Comment, The Constitutional Right
To WitholdPrivate Information, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 536 (1982).
99. See supra notes 93 and 98 and accompanying text. The Whalen Court provides support for
this first aspect of the Constitutional right of privacy: "The first is the right of the individual to be free
in his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24.
100. See supra notes 93 and 98. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy,
to include personal autonomy or decisionmaking in matters of childbearing. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The
Court held, "We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,
.. " Id. at 154. This aspect of the constitutional right to privacy is beyond the scope of this article.
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constitutional invasion of privacy, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
opened the door to future claims against information gathering technologies
like Jntellidata. l0' Further, Whalen's patient information discussion is
analogous to Intellidata because both involve the use of computerized
databases to retrieve and store personal information.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,10 2 the Court held that a
statute permitting government archivists to examine President Nixon's
private documents and taped conversations did not violate his constitutional
right to privacy. 10 3  However, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the
constitutional right to informational privacy recognized in Whalen'04 and
concluded that Nixon had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal
communications. 105 In its holding, the Nixon Court balanced the intrusion on
a person's right to privacy against the public's interest in the information
gathered.1
0 6
The Nixon balancing test between an individual's right to privacy and
public's interest in obtaining information applies equally to Intellidata.10 7 In
the context of Intellidata, the question becomes whether the public is more
interested in the general statistical and demographic information provided by
Intellidata's Summary Report than the specific, personal information in the
Call Detail Report. A caller's name, number, address, and business or
residence origin in the Call Detail Report appears to be more personal than
the general statistical and demographic information in the Summary Report,
but Call Detail Reports may be less personal than the patient drug records in
For more discussion on this issue, see Marlan C. Walker & Andrew F. Puzder, State Protection Of The
Unborn After Roe v. Wade: A Legislative Proposal, 13 STETSON L. REV. 237 (1984).
101. Justice Brennan stated, "The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future
developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology." Whalen, 429 U.S.
at 607.
102. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
103. See id. at 457 ("We agree with the District Court that the Act does not unconstitutionally
invade appellant's right of privacy.").
104. See id. The Court said, "One element of privacy has been characterized as 'the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . .- Id. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
105. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
106. See id. The Court said, "[Any intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in
subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administration to archival screening. Under this
test, the privacy interest asserted by appellant is weaker than that found wanting in the recent decision
of Whalen v. Roe, supra." Id. (citations omitted). In its conclusion on the challenged privacy issue, the
Court considered the limited intrusion of the screening, Nixon's status as a public figure, his lack of an
expectation of privacy in the majority of materials, the public interest in possessing the information,
and the difficulty in separating the small quantity of private materials from the public documents and
statements. See id. at 465.
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Whalen. On the other hand, the dissemination of personal information in
Intellidata's Call Detail Report is more widespread than the dissemination of
the patient files in Whalen.1
0 8
In addition to the guidelines set forth in Whalen and Nixon, the Supreme
Court, developed a twofold requirement for "right to privacy" cases in Katz
v. United States.'0 9 First, aperson must have an actual, subjective expectation
of privacy." Second, that expectation must be objectively reasonable."' In
Katz, FBI agents used an electronic listening devise to record a telephone
conversation conducted in a public phone booth." 2 The Court held that the
government agents' conduct constituted an unlawful search and seizure that
violated Katz's expectation of privacy" 13 under the Fourth Amendment.114
In Smith v. Maryland,"5 the Court held that the installation and use of a
pen register" 6 by a telephone company at the request of police did not
constitute an unlawful search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 7 Applying Katz's two-part test," 8 the Court "doubt[ed] that
108. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
109. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Harlan stated: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court also stated:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.... But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear.
Id. at 351-52; see also infra note 112.
110. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
111. Seeid.
112. See id.at 348.
113. See id. at 361. The Court concluded, "[the critical fact in this case is that 'one who occupies
it, [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume' that his conversation is not being intercepted." Id.; see also supra note 109.
114. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. A discussion of the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections
against search and seizure lies beyond the scope of this article. See James Francis Bama, Note,
Reforming The Katz Fourth Amendment "Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy" Test: The Case Of
Infrared Surveillance Of Homes, 49 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 247 (1996); Tracey Maclin,
Informants And The Fourth Amendment: A Reconsideration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573 (1996).
115. 442U.S.735 (1979).
116. A pen register is essentially the opposite of Intellidata. Rather than recording incoming phone
numbers, a pen register records outgoing phone numbers.
A pen register is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line and usually installed at a
central telephone facility. It records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from that line. It does not
identify the telephone numbers from which incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether
any call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed. Its use does not involve any monitoring of
telephone conversations.
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.I (1974).
117. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
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people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers
they dial."' 1 9 The Court also concluded that people should expect telephone
companies to record and use their calling information "for a variety of
legitimate business purposes.' ' 2° In contrast to the majority's view, Justice
Stewart's dissent expressed a desire to protect telephone information as well
as telephone conversations.
121
Whether a caller's expectation of privacy from Intellidata's information
gathering is reasonable under Katz122 depends on whether Intellidata can be
distinguished from the pen register in Smith.123 Smith relied on telephone
customers' knowledge of the use of pen registers because they received
monthly statements with a list of the numbers they dialed. 24 Although billing
statements do not convey similar information about the use of Intellidata,
SWB could warn customers about Intellidata to reduce their expectation of
118. See id. at 740. The Court stated:
Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a
'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation ofprivacy' that has been invaded by government action.
This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two
discrete questions.
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
119. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. Furthermore, the Court stated:
All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company,
since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All
subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records
of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.
... Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to the
phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.
Id. at 742-43 (emphasis added). The Court said that a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers is not objectively reasonable and therefore fails to satisfy the second prong in Katz. See id. at
743-44.
120. Id. at 743; see supra note 115. The Court also suggests that a telephone user assumes the risk
that the telephone company will disclose his personal information to the police or another third party.
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (analogizing that a bank depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in financial information voluntarily disclosed to banks in the ordinary course of business).
121. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I think that the numbers dialed from a
private telephone-like the conversations that occur during a call-are within the constitutional
protection recognized in Katz."). Justice Stewart's dissent concludes with a point particularly relevant
to the facts surrounding Intellidata:
Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed in a publicly distributed
directory, but I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the
local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not because such a list might in some
sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the
places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life.
Id. at 748.
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
124. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
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privacy from Intellidata's information gathering. 125
In conclusion, Intellidata does not fit the traditional mold of privacy under
Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence. 126 However, if
opponents of Intellidata can overcome the state action hurdle, it is possible
that the "penumbras" will protect the caller's privacy. Yet, there are two
substantive obstacles to applying the Constitution to Intellidata. First,
opponents must distinguish Intellidata from the pen register in Smith. Second,
opponents must satisfy the Katz test by demonstrating that callers have an
actual expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable.
B. Other Legal Implications
Overcoming the procedural hurdle of state action and applying the
"penumbras" of the Constitution to informational privacy matters such as
Intellidata presents a formidable and unpredictable task. However, statutes,
common law, and administrative regulations can provide a more direct and
certain approach to addressing informational privacy matters.
1. Statutory Law: Wiretap Statutes
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986127
to "update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.' 28
This statute prohibits the unauthorized interception of wire and electronic
communications. 129 It also prohibits the unauthorized use of a trap and trace
device, 30 defined as a "device which captures the incoming electronic or
125. An expectation of privacy from telecommunications services like Intellidata may also depend
on whether the caller's number and address are listed in the phone directory.
126. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
127. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2513,
2515-2521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1994)).
128. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555-56. For more
information about federal statutory law with respect to informational privacy, the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, see Raphael Winick, Searches
And Seizures Of Computers And Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 90-102 (1994). For a
discussion of the Digital Telephony Act of 1994, see Michelle Skatoff-Gee, Comment, Changing
Technologies And The Expectation Of Privacy: A Modern Dilemma, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.L 189, 204
(1996).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(I)(a) (1994). This section codifies Title I of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which prohibits the unauthorized interception and disclosure of
wire, oral, and electronic communications. See id. There is an exception to this prohibition "where one
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." Id. § 2511(2)(d). For
a more detailed discussion of this statute, see Thomas R. Greenburg, Comment, E-Mail And Voice
Mail: Employee Privacy And The Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 219 (1994).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1994). This section also prohibits the unauthorized use of a pen
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other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or
device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.,,
13
'
Most importantly, the exceptions to this general prohibition apply more
directly to Caller ID than Intellidata1 32 Consequently, federal statutes
provide a more direct attack on Intellidata than the federal constitution.
Additionally, Missouri's wiretap statute prohibits the interception of wire
communications.
133
2. Common Law: Tort Invasion of Privacy
Common law invasion of privacy is actually a set of four distinct torts. 1
34
The first deals with unreasonable invasions into an individual's private
register, which is the same device that the Supreme Court held does not violate a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy in Smith v. Maryland. See supra notes 123 and 125, and accompanying text.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994).
132. There are three exceptions to the general prohibition against use of trap and trace devices by
a provider of electronic or wire communication services:
(1) relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or electronic communication
service or to the protection of the rights or property of such provider, or to the protection of users
of that service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; (2) to record the fact that a wire or
electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another
provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication, or a user of that
service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service; or (3) where the consent of the user
of that service has been obtained.
18 U.S.C. § 3121(bXl)-(3) (1994). The first and second exceptions above have sparked discussion
over whether Caller lID is exempt from the general prohibition against trap and trace devices because
one of the purposes of Caller ID is to prevent abusive use of the telephone. See Oates, supra note 24, at
222-25. However, unlike Caller ID, Intellidata does not qualify under these exceptions because the
service is not designed to prevent abusive use of wire or electronic communications. See supra notes
26-34.
Therefore, if Intellidata is a "trap and trace" device, it may be exempt from the general prohibition
against trap and trace devices only if "the consent of the user of that service has been obtained." 18
U.S.C. 3121(b)(3) (1994). With respect to the consent requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(3) (1994),
the FCC has stated:
We conclude that a telephone carrier obtains the 'consent' of the user to have incoming calls
trapped and traced when that user subscribes to the carrier's Caller ID service, often by agreeing to
pay a fee for it. Although not every court or commentator agrees with us, we conclude that the
relevant 'user' of the wire communication service with respect to a trap and trace device is the
subscriber whose incoming calls are being trapped and traced, not those subscribers whose
outgoing calls happen to be identified by such device.
In re Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service-Caller ID (1994),
9 F.C.C.RI 1764 9 FCC Red 1764, 1777 (1994), available in 1994 FCC LEXIS 1858, at *94
n.6 (1994) (Part III of Appendix D of this report and order of proposed rulemaking).
133. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 542.402.1(1) (1995); see James R. Wyrseh & Anthony P. Nugent, Jr.,
Missouri's New Wiretap Law, 48 J. Mo. B. 21 (1992); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
134. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389-410 (1960); see also W. PAGE
KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
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affairs, 1 a5  but does not require actual physical intrusion. Examples of
nonphysical intrusion covered by this tort include eavesdropping,
wiretapping, and peering into the windows of a home. 36 Public disclosure of
private facts is a second type of privacy invasion. 37 The third tort involves
the public portrayal of a person in a false light.138 The fourth tort, known as
appropriation, 139 involves the commercial exploitation of a person's notoriety
or prestige without permission.
40
The invasion of privacy torts present several practical problems when
applied to Intellidata. Public portrayal of a person in a false light does not
apply because the information sold is not false.14 This tort and the public
disclosure of private facts tort also require that the information be public.
Intellidata opponents must argue that the sale of reports to business
customers is public in order to state a viable claim under these torts. Such an
argument is tenuous, however, because the reports are sold to select business
customers rather than the general public. Contrary to publishing personal
information in magazines or newspapers, selling information to select
customers is not truly public.
135. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 930 (1994). This tort is also
known as intrusion upon the seclusion of another in some states.
136. See id. In Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 240 (N.H. 1964), the plaintiffs, husband and
wife, alleged that the defendant invaded their privacy by installing and concealing a listening and
recording device in their bedroom. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire phrased the issue as
"whether this state recognizes that intrusion upon one's physical and mental solitude or seclusion is a
tort." Id. The court concluded that the defendant's conduct was a violation of their right of privacy and
constituted a tort. See id. at 242.
137. See HENDERSON, supra note 135, at 930-31. The disclosure must be public, the facts must be
private, and the disclosure must be offensive to a reasonable man. See id. An example is where a
newspaper publishes an offensive statement about a person's private life.
138. See id at 931-32. This tort occurs when a book, article, or advertisement uses ideas
purportedly of the plaintiff to promote its own products or ideas. See id. Like the intrusion tort, supra
notes 139-40, this tort requires publicity. Unlike the intrusion tort, this tort involves lies rather than
truthful statements.
139. See HENDERSON, supra note 135, at 932-33.
140. Unlike the other three torts for invasion of privacy, appropriation is meant to protect the
plaintiff's proprietary interest in her name and identity rather than mental distress. That is, the tort of
appropriation involves property law. See State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733
S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Elvis involved a dispute between two not-for-profit corporations
concerning their respective rights to use Elvis Presley's name. See id. At issue was whether Elvis'
name was property and therefore descendable upon death. See id. at 93. The court answered this
question in the affirmative, and referred to such a right as a right to publicity. See Id. at 97. However,
the court noted the difficulty in distinguishing between a right to publicity and a right to privacy. See
id. at 93-94. The court concluded that a person's name is a species of intangible personal property
worthy of the same bundle of rights and legally protected interests as tangible personal property. See
id. at 97. Included in this bundle of rights is the ability to control and exclude others. See id. at 96.
141. One might argue that the demographic statistics based on a caller's zip code + 4 put the caller
in a false light. This argument is somewhat tenuous because it claims that the public portrayal is a
misrepresentation rather than a false statement, as required by this tort.
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The public disclosure of private facts tort likewise appears problematic
because the information provided by Intellidata arguably is not private. Yet
this does not apply to callers whose personal information is unlisted or
unpublished. Nevertheless, this tort probably would fail to satisfy the
publicity requirement. Appropriation requires the commercial exploitation of
a person's name and notoriety. Intellidata exploits names but not the
notoriety or likeness of those names. Also, the appropriation of a person's
name must be offensive to a reasonable man, which is unlikely in light of the
public success of Intellidata's predecessor, Caller ID.1 42 Finally, the tort of
intrusion into a person's private affairs is most applicable to Intellidata 43
However, this tort also may be inapplicable to Intellidata because it requires
an invasion of private facts that is offensive to a reasonable man. As stated
earlier, it would be difficult to argue that a person's name, number, and
address are private if that information is listed or published in a public
directory.
3. Administrative and Regulatory Law
Administrative and regulatory law can have a greater impact on
Intellidata than constitutional, statutory, or common law.144 The Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") can regulate Intellidata under the
Communications Act of 1934, which grants the FCC the authority to regulate
"all interstate and foreign communications by wire.' ' 145 As a federal agency,
the FCC can enact rules regulating services, such as Intellidata, that preempt
state regulations. 146 At the state level, the MPSC has the authority to both
approve and regulate Intellidata.147 Regulation by the MPSC presents the
most direct method of attacking Intellidata.1
48
142. See supra note 18.
143. See supra notes 139-40.
144. For example, the FCC began regulating Caller ID seven years after its introduction. See In re
Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service - Caller ID, 9 FCC Rcd. 1764
(1994), available in 1994 FCC LEXIS 1858 (1994) (FCC adopts a report and order of proposed
rulemaking); Calling Number Identification, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,318 (1994) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt.
64 subpart P (1996)); Calling Number Identification Service - Caller ID, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,489 (1995)
(amendments to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 64 subpart P); see also Caller ID to be Available
Nationwide: FCCAdopts Federal Policies for Regulation, 1994 FCC LEXIS 995 (March 8, 1994).
145. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)-(b) (1994). For more information about administrative and regulatory law
with respect to informational privacy, the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, see Winick, supra note 128, at 90-102.
146. See Laura V. Eng, Article, Blocking Preemption: Convergence, Privacy, and the FCC's
Misguided Regulation of Caller ID, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J 407,430-35 (1996).
147. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 386.250 (Supp. 1996).
148. See Part VI of this Note, which proposes two regulatory solutions to the privacy issues raised
by Intellidata.
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V. CONCLUSION
Intellidata launches an aggressive information gathering campaign against
people who call businesses. Intellidata has created privacy issues that are
more pervasive and controversial than those surrounding its predecessor,
Caller ID.
The privacy issues raised by Intellidata originate from the specific
personal information in the Call Detail Report rather than the general
demographic information in the Summary Report. The Call Detail Report
provides information such as a caller's business or residence origin, first and
last name, area code and phone number, street address, and zip code + 4. The
Summary Report provides general statistical summaries of demographic
information. 14 9 Despite this, the demographic information in the current
version of Intellidata does not invade privacy primarily because this
information is not personal-yet.
The demographic information in the Summary Report is not personal for
two reasons. First, Intellidata does not take demographic information directly
from the caller's household; rather the information provided represents an
average based on the number of households within the caller's zip code +
4.150 Second, each caller contributes to the demographic information in
Summary Reports, but the information is not associated with a particular
caller.151 That is, Intellidata does not attach a symbol denoting a demographic
code to the caller's name in the Call Detail Report. Fortunately, the current
version of Intellidata does not permit this potential problem. 52 Therefore, the
statistical analysis in the Summary Report, including the information
provided by demographic codes, most likely does not violate any area of law
involving privacy. The privacy issues implicated by Intellidata are the result
of the specific personal information contained in the Call Detail Report.
This Note examined the various areas of the law implicated by the
privacy issues described above. Specifically, it addressed how those privacy
issues raise constitutional, statutory, administrative, regulatory, and common
law concerns.1
53
The constitutional right to privacy creates two problems for Intellidata
149. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
150. Seesupra note 33.
151. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
152. The demographic code could be tied to a particular caller by marking a symbol, such as P for
Poor, next to a caller's name. The current version of Intellidata does not do this, but future versions of
Intellidata, or other computer and telecommunications services may invade privacy by tying general
demographic information to a particular caller.
153. See Part IV of this Note conceming Legal Implications of Caller Intellidata.
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opponents. 154 First, a court must determine that the MPSC's approval of
Intellidata constitutes state action. 55 Second, considerable uncertainty
surrounds the constitutional right to informational privacy as it applies to new
technologies like Intellidata.156 However, the federal wiretap statute provides
a more direct attack on Intellidata. More importantly, unlike Caller ID,
Intellidata does not qualify under any exceptions to the general prohibition
against trap and trace devices. 57 The common law tort of intrusion into a
plaintiff's private affairs is applicable to Intellidata.15 8 However, the
information gathered by Intellidata most likely does not constitute an
intrusion upon private facts unless the caller's information is unlisted.
Finally, this Note concludes that administrative and regulatory law at both
the state and federal levels present the most effective approach to address the
privacy issues raised by Intellidata.'
5 9
VI. PROPOSAL
The test articulated in Nixon that balanced personal intrusion against the
public's interest in acquiring a caller's first and last name, area code and
phone number, street address, city, and zip code + 4160 should weigh in favor
of protecting a caller's personal profile from disclosure every time he or she
calls a business. However, any proposal regarding Intellidata should balance
the non-personal information that helps businesses improve the production,
quality, marketing, and distribution of their goods and services against the
caller's personal information. Two proposals achieve this result.
The first proposal is modeled after the regulatory scheme employed by
the Texas Public Utilities Commission, which simply does not permit Call
Detail Reports in its version of Intellidata' 61 This type of regulatory scheme
could be implemented at the state level by the MPSC or at the federal level
by the FCC. 62 Under this scheme, Intellidata could still provide the general
statistical summaries and demographic information provided by Intellidata's
Summary Report.
The second proposal follows the regulatory scheme adopted by the
154. See Part IV(A) of this Note.
155. See supra notes 44-90 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 91-126 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 22, 127-33 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 134-43.
159. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 106.
161. See supra note 29. The brochures and pamphlets provided by SWB specify that the Call
Detail Report is not included in Texas Intellidata reports.
162. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") with respect to Caller
ID.l163 The CPUC provides free per-line blocking from Caller ID to all
California residents. 64 This scheme gives the caller the option of
automatically preventing the disclosure of personal information every time
he or she places a call to a business. 16 However, Intelidata customers would
have the right to reject callers who activate this option.166 Under this
approach, in order to contact the Intellidata customer, the caller must take an
affi ative step to unblock his or her number in order to access the
business.167 This affirmative step would constitute consent as required by
federal 68 and state 69 wiretap laws, and would also eliminate a constitutional
attack on privacy. 70 Consequently, Intellidata could provide both Call Detail
and Summary Reports.
The original tariff to introduce Intellidata in Missouri in 1995 invades
privacy because it allows technology surreptitiously to gain personal
information provided in the Call Detail Report without the caller's consent.
The foregoing proposals tip the scales in favor of individual privacy rights
and consent The result is a balance between information gathering that
allows businesses to make informed decisions and a person's right "to be let
alone."
171
Paul Henroid
163. In In re Pacific Bell, 134 P.U.R.4th 184 (Cal.P.U.C. 1992), the California Public Utilities
Commission ("CPUC") interpreted section 2893 of the public utilities code as requiting a minimum
per-call blocking standard for Caller ID. Nevertheless, it extended the blocking options available to
California residents to ensure greater privacy. See id. CPUC made three blocking options available: I)
per-call blocking; 2) per-line blocking; and 3) per-line blocking with per-call enabling. See fd. at 199,
It made the per-line blocking with per-call enabling the default option for residents with unlisted or
nonpublished telephone numbers. See id. at 201. CPUC also authorized Anonymous Call Rejection to
allow the receiving party to 'Block the Blocker.' See id. at 205-06. This option forces the calling party
to take an affirmative step towards consent by unblocking his or her number in order to access the
receiving party. See id.; see also In re Pacific Bell, 141 P.U.R.4th 320 (Cal.P.U.C. 1992) (CPUC
changes default blocking option from per-line blocking with per-call enabling to per-line blocking
until technological issues are resolved).
164. See Pacific Bell, 134 P.U.R.4th at 186, 200.
165. See id.
166. Seeid. at206.
167. See id.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(3) (1994).
169. See MO. REV. STAT. § 542.402.2(3) (1995).
170. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (recognizing that "This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties") (citations omitted).
171. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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